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A
fter nearly four decades, academic econ-
omists continue to debate financial-market
efficiency as vigorously as ever.1 The original
theoretical arguments put forward in favor of effi-
cient markets were based on the notion of stabiliz-
ing speculation in the form of arbitrage (Friedman,
1953). Simply put, arbitrage is “the simultaneous
purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar,
security in two different markets for advantageously
different prices” (Sharpe and Alexander, 1990). In
theory, a perfectly hedged trading position of this
sort could be executed at no cost (as the short-sale
proceeds are used to finance the long position).
Vigilant traders on the look-out for just such arbi-
trage opportunities would ensure that no one could
consistently “beat the market”—the hallmark of
efficient markets theory.
The academics’ logical case for efficient markets
boils down to a pair of simple rhetorical questions:
Why would utility-maximizing traders leave unex-
ploited any profitable opportunities (after adjusting
properly for risk)? And if no risk-adjusted “free
lunches” exist, how could market prices be predict-
able enough to make money? For several decades,
empirical evidence piled up both for and against
market efficiency. As of the early 1990s, neither
side could claim total vindication. As the 1990s
progressed, however, the weight of the evidence
seemed to tip toward those who claimed asset prices
were, at least to some extent, predictable (Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, Chaps. 2 and 7).
The academic asset-pricing literature today is
dominated by attempts to explain why and to what
extent the price movements of financial assets are
predictable. One potential explanation of stock-
return predictability is that markets are efficient
(“no free lunch”) but expected returns are time-
varying, perhaps being linked to the business cycle.
For example, expected returns may be highest when
economic risks are perceived to be high, such as at
or near the bottom of a business cycle. Conversely,
expected returns may be lowest when economic
risks are perceived to be low, at or near a business-
cycle peak. Thus, the simple random-walk model
of stock returns may be false, but a relevant notion
of market efficiency survives because high returns
are earned only by taking large amounts of risk. A
different type of explanation of return predictability
rejects market efficiency and focuses on market
imperfections of various sorts, such as incomplete
stock-market participation by households, significant
transactions costs, changes in investor sentiment,
or limited wealth and liquidity resources to conduct
arbitrage (as in the current article).2
Whatever its economic explanation, mounting
evidence of return predictability leads Campbell, Lo,
and MacKinlay (1997, p. 24) to suggest that it is time
for financial economists to focus their attention
on the “relative efficiency” of a market instead of
continuing the all-or-nothing battle of attrition that
is characteristic of much of the earlier market effi-
ciency literature.
As we now understand more clearly, the original
case for efficient markets probably leaned too heav-
ily on the notion of risk-free, cost-free arbitrage to
eliminate all profitable trading strategies immedi-
ately. In real markets, arbitrage is neither as easy
nor as effective as economists once had assumed.
For one thing, financial markets are not complete
and frictionless, so arbitrage in general is risky and
costly. In addition, it is not realistic to assume that
the number of informed arbitrageurs or the supply
of financial resources they have to invest in arbitrage
strategies is limitless.
This article builds on an important and insight-
ful recent model of arbitrage by professional traders
who need—but lack—wealth of their own to trade
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Professional arbitrageurs
must convince wealthy but uninformed investors
to entrust them with investment capital in order to
exploit mispricing and push the market back toward
the ideal of efficiency. Unfortunately, arbitrageurs
cannot prove that they recognize the intrinsic (or
“fundamental”) values of the assets they claim are
mispriced. Even worse, it is possible the assets will
1 For early statements of the theory of efficient markets and the unpre-
dictability of asset-price movements, see Fama (1965), Muth (1960),
or Samuelson (1965). For a recent summary of the evidence for return
predictability and its implications for efficient-markets theory, see
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Chap. 2).
2 Ironically, Keynes (1936, Chap. 12) clearly foreshadowed the recent
interest in investor sentiment and liquidity for understanding stock
market behavior, but was forgotten for decades as the efficient-markets
hypothesis dominated the academic discussion.
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eventually to their intrinsic values. Having incurred
losses, the outside investors may demand their
money back at this point even though the expected
profit of staying invested actually has increased.
Thus, market efficiency may depend ultimately
on the successful resolution of a principal-agent
problem that exists between informed but wealth-
constrained arbitrageurs and uninformed wealthy
investors. The resulting degree of market efficiency
may change over time and differ across markets,
and it could depend importantly on factors such as
the outside investors’ use of performance-based
(“feedback”) strategies when deciding on the possi-
ble termination of ongoing investment mandates.
After developing a simple model of wealth-
constrained professional arbitrage that departs in
several important aspects from the canonical Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) model, we calibrate our model
to illustrate its qualitative features. We show that the
existence of professional arbitrageurs mitigates—
but cannot eliminate—mispricing in the market
relative to intrinsic values, regardless of how sensi-
tive the outside investors are to arbitrageurs’ past
performance in deciding whether to remain invested
with them. We also show that arbitrage dampens
the unconditional volatility of asset returns, which
we measure as the expected value of squared returns.
Most importantly, the presence of arbitrageurs limits
both the degree of increased mispricing and level
of volatility during a financial crisis, which we define
as a period of heightened volatility and acute short-
age of liquidity.3 This result points out that profes-
sional arbitrageurs tend to stabilize markets even
when they are wealth-constrained. Other papers
show that investors who use “positive feedback”
trading strategies—such as portfolio insurers—tend
to destabilize markets (Grossman and Zhou, 1996).
We analyze a three-date (two-period) model of
an aspiring professional arbitrageur (or “convergence
trader” in the language of Kyle and Xiong, 2001,
and Xiong, 2001) who must obtain financing from
investors less informed than he is about the intrin-
sic value of a financial asset—that is, its liquidation
value at the end of the second period. In addition to
these two types of individuals, there are noise traders
who have wealth to invest but who misperceive the
asset’s intrinsic value. It is the noise traders who
drive the asset’s price away from the intrinsic value.
The investors provide the arbitrageur with funds
to invest in an underpriced asset at the outset of the
model. The price is observed again at the end of the
first period, at which time the investors may “roll
over” their funds with the arbitrageur or demand
their money back if they have lost confidence in his
ability. The asset will assume its intrinsic value at the
end of the second period with certainty, although
only the arbitrageur knows in advance what that
value is. Consequently, the two-period return on the
arbitrageur’s private information would be both posi-
tive and risk-free if he could be assured of financing.
Our set-up highlights the fact that a two-period
risk-free arbitrage nevertheless can be risky over a
one-period horizon in the presence of noise traders
and financial constraints on the arbitrageur. The
risk arises because the arbitrageur needs outside
investors, and these outside investors might revise
their beliefs about the arbitrageur’s talent at the
interim date, based on the return the arbitrageur
achieved in the first period. If the investors down-
wardly revise their beliefs about the arbitrageur’s
abilities because the fund lost money due to a deep-
ening of the mispricing, they might withdraw their
money precisely when the expected return on the
arbitrage is at its maximum. One implication is that
the arbitrageur will invest “strategically”—that is,
he will not invest as much initially as he would in a
world without wealth constraints—in order to hedge
against the possibility of being unable to exploit
even greater mispricing should it occur one period
ahead. Of course, this is not a new finding; for papers
with similar results, see Grossman and Vila (1992),
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), or Gromb and Vayanos
(2001).4 Our paper’s contributions in this respect
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3 Myron Scholes (2000) suggests that the global financial crisis of 1997-
98 was characterized by an increase in volatility, especially in equity
markets, and a flight to liquidity (that is, a preference by many investors
for assets whose liquidity was expected to be good). The crisis was
accentuated by the “negotiated bankruptcy” of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), a hedge fund in which Scholes himself was a
partner. According to Scholes, prior to the crisis, LTCM “was in the
business of supplying liquidity” and therefore its demise worsened
the crisis by eliminating the liquidity it had been supplying. A theoretical
analysis relevant to this episode is Xiong (2001).
4 The first rigorous investigations of the multi-period investment problem
were Merton (1971, 1973) and Breedon (1979). Merton concluded that
a trader should keep a constant fraction of his wealth invested in the
risky asset at all times. The fraction depends on the asset’s expected
return and risk and the investor’s degree of risk aversion. Grossman
and Vila (1992) added leverage and solvency constraints to the dynamic
trader’s problem. Their trader optimally commits more wealth to the
risky asset the shorter is the investment horizon and the further from
the leverage constraint (not just today but prospectively in the future)
the trader finds himself. Campbell and Viceira (1999) is a recent exami-
nation of the problem under the assumption that the investor is aware
that the probability distributions from which asset returns are drawn
change over time.
Emmons and Schmid REVIEWare a more realistic objective function for the arbi-
trageur and a set-up in which the arbitrageur’s trad-
ing significantly affects the asset’s price. Our model
generates interior solutions and we provide cali-
brated illustrations of the model’s results. While
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assume that the arbi-
trageur maximizes assets under management, we
assume that he maximizes his income. The arbi-
trageur’s income is determined by an incentive
scheme that resembles real-world contracts of hedge
fund managers.
THE MODEL
There are three types of agents in the model.
Noise traders have wealth but misperceive the intrin-
sic value of a financial asset. Professional arbitrageurs
have no wealth or borrowing capacity but know the
intrinsic value of the financial asset. Investors have
wealth but no insight into the financial asset’s intrin-
sic value. Unlike noise traders, investors know that
they cannot recognize the asset’s intrinsic value.
All parties are risk-neutral.
The investors may provide the arbitrageur with
funds to invest in an underpriced asset at the outset
of the model (see Figure 1). We refer to this arrange-
ment as a hedge fund. Noise traders misperceive
the intrinsic value of at least one financial asset in
the economy, which generates arbitrage opportuni-
ties that so-called “long-short” investment strategies
seek to exploit. Asset mispricing implies that there
are relatively overpriced and relatively underpriced
assets, which means that a portfolio that is long on
the relatively undervalued asset and short on the
relatively overvalued asset trades below intrinsic
value.
We treat a market-neutral long-short portfolio
as a single, complex financial asset. Arbitrage is the
process of acquiring a long-short portfolio and hold-
ing it until its price returns to the portfolio’s intrinsic
value. The long-short portfolio that any arbitrageur
might hold defines a market segment of a larger
arbitrage industry. We assume that arbitrageurs are
highly skilled people who pursue proprietary trading
strategies and therefore enjoy a monopoly in their
segment. For simplicity only, we make the assump-
tion that the operating costs in the arbitrage industry
are zero.
The risk-free rate of return, and therefore the
opportunity cost of capital, is zero. For simplicity,
we assume that risky assets trading at fair value—
including the stock market index—also have an
expected return of zero. This implies that there are
no priced systematic risk factors in the economy,
that is, there is no equity risk premium.
The asset trades at three moments in time, t
(t=1,2,3). We capture the influence of the noise
traders’ misperceptions of the intrinsic value of the
asset at times t1 and t2 with the parameters S1 and
S2, respectively. There is no fundamental risk in the
model because the price of the asset will revert to
the intrinsic value at a known date (t3) with certainty
(so S3=0).
The supply of the financial asset is unity. Noise
traders’ demand for the financial asset at time t
(t=1,2,3) is expressed as
(1) , 0 ≤ St<V,
where pt is the price of the financial asset and St is
the misperception of the noise traders about the
intrinsic value of the financial asset. Because the
financial asset in question is a long-short portfolio
whose value is underestimated by the noise traders,
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t1 t2 t3financial asset. Without misperception (S=0), the
noise traders would be willing to absorb the unit
supply of the asset or, in other words, the asset would
trade at the intrinsic value (pt=V).
The arbitrageur is compensated in two ways in
accord with actual practice—via an up-front “man-
agement fee” and an after-the-fact performance-
based “incentive fee.”5 At the beginning of each
period, he receives a fraction (α) of the assets under
management, and at the end of the period he receives
a fraction (β) of any positive return on the portfolio.
This corresponds to compensation structures in
real-world hedge funds, where managers typically
collect α=1 percent or α=2 percent of the equity
capital, plus β=20 percent of any positive return
on the fund’s equity. We assume that the arbitrageur
invests his entire fee income in the fund. This is
because he recognizes the profitability of the fund’s
activities.
The variable Ft denotes the total financial
resources available to the arbitrageur at time t
(t=1,2,3). The value of F1 is exogenous, while the
quantities F2 and F3 are determined in the model.
The startup capital, F1, is provided solely by the
investors, while the arbitrageur acquires the share
α in F1 immediately as part of his compensation.
The arbitrageur acquires additional equity at t2 in
the amount of a fraction α of the outsiders’ share
in F2. Furthermore, the arbitrageur acquires equity
in the fund through capital gains on his equity
position and through his share β in the capital
gains on the outsiders’ equity. The quantity F3 is the
fund’s liquidation value. Note that the arbitrageur
is both the general equity partner of the fund and
its manager, receiving compensation from outside
investors (limited partners) according to the fee
schedule described above.
We assume that the fund raises equity capital
only at the outset—at t1. This assumption prevents
the arbitrageur from diluting initial investors’ equity
stakes later on. Remember that the arbitrageur’s
compensation depends not only on the return on
but also on the amount of the outsiders’ equity
capital under management. The arbitrageur there-
fore might have an incentive to raise fresh capital
at t2, particularly if he expects low returns in the
second period. This would dilute the fund’s existing
investors’ equity stakes. Thus, we assume (in keeping
with typical hedge-fund arrangements) that the fund
closes to new and existing investors after raising
the initial capital. Reinvested capital gains are conse-
quently the sole source of additional equity capital
in the second period.
At time t2, the price of the asset either reverts
to V or it does not. If the asset price is V at t2, the
arbitrageur liquidates the fund and holds cash until
t3. If the asset price does not equal V at t2, the arbi-
trageur invests aggressively—albeit not all of the
fund’s cash—in the underpriced asset. This portfolio
then generates a risk-free return because the asset
price rises to V at t3 with certainty.
The arbitrageur’s (that is, the hedge fund’s)
demand for the asset at the interim date, t2, is given
by
(2)
where D2 is the amount of the hedge fund’s demand
in dollars. The amount F2 – D2 ≥ 0 is held in cash.
Because total demand aggregated across noise
traders and the arbitrageur must equal the asset
supply of one unit (QN2+QA2=1), the price of the
financial asset at t2 is determined by combining (1)
and (2):
(3)
The condition D2<S2 implies that the asset still
trades at a discount to the intrinsic value at t2: p2<V.
This assumption recognizes the arbitrageur’s incen-
tive not to bid up the price all the way to intrinsic
value immediately—an implication of the fact that
the arbitrageur will be compensated during the last
period for achieving a positive return on investment.
As shown by Grossman and Vila (1992), the
arbitrageur does not want to invest all of F1 in the
asset at t1, either. After all, the asset may become
even more underpriced at t2, in which event he will
want to increase his investment (“double up”). With
D1 denoting the amount the arbitrageur invests in
the asset at t1, we have
(4) ,
which implies the initial asset price will be
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5 Amin and Kat (2001) report that hedge funds typically charge their
investors a fixed annual “management fee” of 1 or 2 percent of assets
under management plus an “incentive fee” of 15 to 25 percent of the
fund’s realized annual return. The incentive fee is waived if a particular
“hurdle rate” has not been achieved, which can be a fixed number or
a reference rate such as the T-bill rate plus or minus a spread. Most
funds also apply a “high-water mark” provision, which requires the
fund to make up any past losses before the incentive fee is paid. We
assume the hurdle rate is zero, and we exclude any high-water mark
for the sake of simplicity. 
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The condition D1<S1 implies p1<V, which again
captures the fact that the arbitrageur will not bid
the price all the way up to the asset’s intrinsic value
because of the incentives built into his compensa-
tion schedule.
The investors have prior beliefs about the arbi-
trageur’s talent in exploiting possible asset mispric-
ing, but are not perfectly informed. Investors update
their beliefs about the arbitrageur’s talent using a
simple Bayesian learning rule, which is based solely
on the arbitrageur’s past performance. When past
returns are poor, investors don’t know for sure
whether the poor returns are due to a random error
(noise), a deepening of noise trader misperception
(bad luck), or truly inferior investment talent. Pulling
some of their money from the hedge fund after the
asset mispricing has deepened—that is, when the
expected return on the long-short portfolio is
highest—is the investor’s rational response to the
problem of inferring the arbitrageur’s (unobservable)
talent from data that are ambiguous (that is, observa-
tionally equivalent under more than one possible
economic structure).
The investor’s rule of updating his beliefs about
the arbitrageur’s talent implies that, if the hedge
fund loses money during the first period, the fund
faces withdrawals at the interim date, t2. Specifically,
we assume that the withdrawals at t2 are a multiple
of the hedge fund’s posted gross return (that is,
before management fees) at t2, denoted R2, should
this return be negative. Remember that, while
investors can withdraw capital, they cannot inject
additional funds. Thus, the supply of funds in the
second period is the following6:
(6)
where γ is a parameter that determines the respon-
siveness of the investor to past performance. For
γ=1, poor first-period returns do not shake the
confidence of investors in the arbitrageur’s talent.
At the other extreme, responsiveness that becomes
unboundedly large implies that even a small first-
period loss is multiplied into a huge withdrawal of
funds. Note that the outside investors may withdraw
only what is theirs. This means that, even if the out-
siders pull all of their money, the arbitrageur’s equity
stake remains and the fund can stay in business.
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   pV SD DS 11 1 1 1   , . =− + < The arbitrageur knows that—despite a temporary
deepening of the mispricing—the price of the asset
will revert to intrinsic value at t3 for certain, so he
will keep his own money invested, come what may.
Our multiplicative feedback rule provides the
arbitrageurs with what may be a more realistic incen-
tive structure than the linear feedback rule in Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). Our feedback rule does not penal-
ize small negative returns quite as severely for a
high degree of responsiveness, γ, as is the case in
Shleifer and Vishny. For a responsiveness coefficient
of γ=5, for instance, a gross return in the first period,
R2, of –1 percent reduces the fund’s equity capital
by approximately 4 percentage points. A 5 percent
loss, on the other hand, leaves the fund with approxi-
mately 77 percent of its equity capital at the begin-
ning of the next period. We provide more results
from the model below.
The gross return of the hedge fund in the first
period, R2, is given by
(7)
The fund’s first-period return consists of its return
on the financial asset, normalized by the total funds
available for investment.
For simplicity, we assume a specific form of
uncertainty about noise trader sentiment at t2, S2.
With probability 1 – q (0<q<1), noise traders recog-
nize the true value of the asset, which implies S2=0.
In this case, the arbitrageur liquidates at t2 and holds
cash until t3. Then the arbitrageur’s assets under
management at t3 would amount to
(8)
where 
On the other hand, noise trader misperception
deepens to S2 with probability q, S2=S>S1(>0). If
noise traders continue to misperceive the intrinsic
value of the asset, the hedge fund’s assets at t3 will
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6 Some hedge funds have “lock-up” periods of one to three years, while
others allow investors to withdraw money with only a few weeks’
notice. As a result of the poor quality of investors’ information about
the arbitrageur’s talent, the arbitrageur’s past performance often is a
major determinant of the resources he receives to manage, regardless




The arbitrageur’s total income consists of
management fees and capital gains on reinvested
management fees. The expected value of the man-
agement fees, MF, equals the sum of the expected
values of the management fees collected at t1(MF1),
at t2(MF2), and at t3(MF3). The expected value of the
capital gains is CG. The arbitrageur’s maximization
problem therefore is
(10)
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misperception deepen in the first period, while
MF2
S2=0 is the fee income if the asset price reverts
to intrinsic value. The arbitrageur also captures capi-
tal gains on the equity he builds from the reinvested
management fees. The expected value of the capital
gains, CG, equals
(14)
The arbitrageur’s choice variables are D1(≤F1)
and D2(≤F2
S2=S), which are the amounts the arbi-
trageur invests in the asset at t1 and t2, respectively.
Unless the asset reverts to intrinsic value at t2(p2=V),
the t2 price of the asset given in equation (3) is a
function of the t2 choice variable, D2. Similarly, the
t1 price of the asset given in equation (5) is a function
of the choice variable, D1.
SOLUTION TO THE MAXIMIZATION
PROBLEM
We solve the maximization problem numeri-
cally. We hold constant all of the following: V=1;
F1=S1=0.2; S2=0.4; q=1– q=0.5; α=0.02; and
β=0.2. Note that F1=S1=0.2 means that the arbi-
trageur has sufficient buying power to eliminate the
t1 mispricing entirely if so desired. Also, note that
0.4=S2>S1=0.2 means that noise trader mispercep-
tion may deepen between t1 to t2—that is, the asset
may become even more mispriced. For the values
chosen for S1, S2, and q, noise trader misperception,
S, is as likely to double as it is to vanish. Thus, the
expected value of noise trader misperception in the
second period, q·S2, equals the noise trader misper-
ception observed in the first period, S1.
We vary γ, the responsiveness to past perfor-
mance of fund withdrawals, from γ=1 (no responsive-
ness by the investors to past investment performance,
that is, no withdrawals) to γ=20 (extreme respon-
siveness) with a step length of unity. We use a grid
search method to solve the maximization problem.
This involves varying D1 and D2 independently in
very small increments within their bounds, 0 ≤ Di ≤
Fi (i=1,2), to find the maximum of the objective
function.
The findings of the grid search are displayed
in Figures 2 through 5. The first important point to
make concerns the extent to which the presence
of the hedge fund affects asset mispricing. Figure 2
shows that the mispricing is less pronounced in each
period than it would be without the hedge fund.
CG q R MF R R MF
qR M F
SS SS SS SS
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Emmons and Schmid REVIEWRemember that, without arbitrage, the first-period
price, p1, and the expected value of the second-period
price, E[p2], both would equal 0.8 (shown as a dashed
line). On the other hand, without noise traders, the
asset would trade at unit value in both periods (not
shown). The hedge fund almost halves the difference
between the expected value of the second-period
price, E[p2] (shown as solid circles), and the asset’s
intrinsic, unit value. In fact, the degree of investor
responsiveness, γ, has little bearing on E[p2], which
approaches the value of approximately 0.8873
(shown as a solid horizontal line) as γ approaches
infinity. By comparison, the degree of responsiveness
has a strong impact on the first-period price, p1
(shown as open boxes). This is because the arbitra-
geur treads even more cautiously when putting on
this trade in the first period when he knows that the
investors penalize negative returns with sizeable
withdrawals. In fact, the higher is γ, the more cash
the arbitrageur holds in the first period, and therefore,
the lower is p1. As the degree of investor responsive-
ness, γ, goes to infinity, the amount the arbitrageur
invests in the first period goes to zero and, conse-
quently, the first-period price, p1, converges to 0.8—
the value the asset would adopt if there were no
hedge fund in the market (shown as a dashed line).
Thus we conclude that the hedge fund pushes the
price of the asset (or its respective expected value)
toward the intrinsic, unit value in both periods. This
is our first main finding.
Figure 3 shows the unconditional volatility of
the asset’s returns for various degrees of investor
responsiveness, γ. The unconditional volatility is
calculated as the expected value of the squared
returns over the two periods. For low values of
investor responsiveness, volatility increases as γ
increases. For high values of responsiveness, a fur-
ther increase in γ reduces volatility monotonically.
As γ goes to infinity, volatility approaches a level
(as shown by the solid line) that is lower than the
volatility level at γ=1 (as indicated by the leftmost
symbol), which is the benchmark case of unwaver-
ing investor confidence in the hedge fund manager.
The reason for this “volatility hump” lies in the exis-
tence of two opposite effects. All else equal, the
higher γ is, the bigger is the drop in the asset’s price
from t1 to t2 should the noise traders’ misperception
deepen. On the other hand, the higher γ is, the lower
is the price of the asset at t1 because the arbitrageur
puts less money to work. For low values of investor
responsiveness, the volatility-increasing effect domi-
nates. For increasingly higher values of γ, this effect
becomes progressively weaker until it vanishes for
an infinitely large degree of investor responsiveness.
It is important to note that the hedge fund
greatly reduces asset price volatility, regardless of
the degree of investor responsiveness. The uncon-
ditional volatility without the hedge fund runs at
0.5694 (not shown), which is a multiple of the volatil-
ity that we observe even at the degree of responsive-
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Effect of Investor Responsiveness on 
Asset Price Volatility
Figure 3ness that generates the highest level of volatility.
Thus, we conclude that the hedge fund unambigu-
ously reduces unconditional volatility. This is our
second main finding.
Another way to look at the impact of arbitrage
on volatility is to ask how the market behaves when
asset mispricing deepens. Such an event—if severe—
might cause, or occur alongside, a financial crisis.
Figure 4 shows, for the case of a deepening noise
trader misperception of the asset’s intrinsic value,
the first-period asset return as a function of investor
responsiveness. The absolute value of the percentage
decline of the asset price increases with investor
responsiveness, γ. For an infinitely high value of γ,
the arbitrageur holds cash in the first period and
then invests aggressively at t2, although he does not
invest all the cash available. The horizontal line in
Figure 4 signifies the first-period return for this
borderline case of an infinite degree of responsive-
ness. Note that, without a hedge fund, the first-period
return would amount to a negative 25 percent (not
shown), which is more than twice as much (in abso-
lute value) as what is observed even with a degree
of responsiveness of zero (that is, γ equal to one).
Hence, we conclude that the presence of a hedge
fund dampens volatility in the event of a deepening
of noise trader misperception, as might occur in a
financial panic. This is our third main finding.
Finally, we are interested in the question of how
investor responsiveness affects the arbitrageur’s
profit, that is, his incentive to set up a hedge fund
and engage in arbitrage. Figure 5 shows the arbi-
trageur’s profit as a function of γ. Not surprisingly,
the profit of the arbitrageur decreases monotonically
with increased investor responsiveness to past per-
formance. The monotonic decline in the profitability
of arbitrage with increasing investor responsiveness
to past performance is a manifestation of the fact
that liquidating a hedge portfolio when the expected
return from arbitrage is highest is counterproduc-
tive—that is, it runs against “the nature of the trade.”
CONCLUSION
Even financially constrained professional
arbitrageurs may be able to exploit asset mispricing
if they can link up with rational but uninformed
investors. To achieve this goal, the two parties must
overcome—at least to a degree—the problem of
asymmetric information about the arbitrageur’s
talent. The result of such an endeavor is a hedge
fund that goes long on (comparatively) underpriced
assets and short on (comparatively) overpriced assets.
As a byproduct, the impacts of noise trader misper-
ceptions on asset prices and volatility are reduced.
This holds for any degree of responsiveness to past
performance (“feedback”) of the investors’ confi-
dence in the arbitrageur’s talent.
This article builds on the dynamic-investment
literature that reaches back at least to Merton (1971).
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Effect of Investor Responsiveness on 
Arbitrageur’s Profit
Figure 5Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided an insightful
model of wealth-constrained arbitrageurs that can
be, and has been, extended in several directions.
We add several realistic features to the professional
arbitrageur’s problem in the canonical model, includ-
ing the ability to build an equity stake in his hedge
fund over time, and a potentially more realistic multi-
plicative (rather than linear) investor feedback rule.
Like Shleifer and Vishny, we assume that the hedge
fund can influence the market price. Hedge funds
do, in fact, sometimes move market prices because
they operate in specialized market segments that
have limited liquidity. It is also true, however, that
hedge funds alone cannot prevent asset-price volatil-
ity or occasional mispricing—which might deepen
before it eventually corrects.
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